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ABS TEACT
In this paper, we survey theoretical models of the effect of the
minimum wage and, in somewhat greater detail, evidence of its effect on
employment and unemployment. Our discussion of the theory emphasizes
recent work using two-sector and heterogeneous-worker models. We then
summarize and evaluate the large literature on employment and unemployment
effects of the minimum on teenagers. Finally, we survey the evidence of
the effect of the minimum wage on adult employment, and on employment in
















Although the arguments for and against the minimum wage are the
same today as at the time of passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act
forty years ago, they are now accompanied by more sophisticated ap-
proaches to the measurement of its impact. Moreover, the increase in
minimum wage coverage makes the issue more important. The employment!
unemployment effect of the minimum wage continues to be a pivotal
issue around which present-day debate centers (Robert Goldfarb, 1974;
Steven Zell,l978; and Sar Levitan and Richard Belous, 1979), and will
be the focus of our attention.
Despite an abundance ofstudies of the employment
and unemployment effects of the minimum wage in the U.S., there is no
comprehensive review of their findings (although E.G. West and
Michael McKee (198O)have undertaken a broad assessment of some of the
Canadian and American literature).The purpose of this article is to
determine what generalizations this literature supports and, to the
extent possible, diagnose the causes of the most important disagree-
ments. This should assist both economists in identifying the direc-
tions for further research in this area and policy makers in inter-
preting the myriad of results.
Section I of this paper discusses the theoretical framework in
which the minimum wage has been analyzed. Sections II and III contain
an analysis of time-series and cross-section studies, respectively,
of the effect of the minimum wage on teenagers, while Section IVPage 2
focuses on the Impact on adults. Section Vdescribes the effects on
low-wage ifldustries and labor markets.Conclusions appear in Section
VI.Page 3
I. THEORY
Most textbook treatments of the employment effects of the minimum
wagerely on the simple supply-and—demand model of price floors, and
the outcome is often contrasted with that which occurs under monopsony.
In recent years, the analysis of the effects of a minimum wage in
competitive labor markets has been significantly extended to include
formal treatment of a minimum wage which applies to one sector of
a two-sector economy, or which has no direct effect on some workers
because they earn more than the minimum.
The first three parts of this section deal briefly with the
traditional analysis, while the next four sections deal with more recent
additions to the literature. A theme which runs through Our treatment of these
additions is how the employment and unemployment effects of the
minimum are related to the parameters which each model introduces.
The final part of this section deals with the implications of these
models for the effect of the minimum wage on the efficiency of the
labor market.Page 4
A. Simple Supply-Demand Model
The most basic model of the effect of the minimum wage on employ-
ment and unemployment focuses on a single competitive labormarket
with homogeneous workers whose wage W0 would otherwise fallbelow the
legally set minimum wage Wm• Employers minimize costsboth before and
after the minimum wage law, workers' skills and level ofeffort are
identical and given exogenously, and all workers in themarket are
covered by the minimum wage. Adjustment to the new equilibriumis not
considered. In this model, initial employment E0 isdetermined by
supply and demand; once the minimum wageis introduced, employment
falls to Em the level demanded at wage Wm (Figure 1).The propor-
tional reduction in employment (n Em2fl E0) is equalto the propor-
tional wage increase (n Wmfl W0) times the elasticityof demand.
If employment would otherwise increase, the"reduction" in em-
ployment predicted by the model may takethe form of a lower rate of
employment growth rather than an actualdecline in the number em-
ployed. If employment actually declines,it may take the form of not
replacing workers who quit rather than dischargingworkers.1
While the model determines an excess supply oflabor at the new
minimum wage, SmEm this excess supply does not correspondto the
official measure of unemployment (Finis Welch, 1976, p.8), or even to
the Increase in such unemployment above some"frictional" level. Sm
represents the number (or work-hours) ofthose persons willing to workPage 5
at Wm but some of the 5mm who are not employedmay decide that
prospects of finding work are too dim to make actively searching for
work worthwhile. Those not actively looking for workare not included
in the official unemployment count.
B. Monopsony
A well-known exception to the conclusion that the minimumwage
reduces employment is the monopsony case (George Stigler, 1946).
Without a minimum wage, the monopsonistjc employer'smarginal cost of
labor everywhere exceeds the supply price; labor is hired untilmar-
ginal cost and demand are equal (Figure 2). A minimum wage makes the
employer a price-taker, up to the level of employmentS(Wm)• Thus, a
minimum wage between W0 and W1 will increase employment (S. Charles
Maurice, 1974); choosing WmW1 brings employment to its competitive
level, E1. Once Wm equals W1, further increases would reduce employment
below the competitive level. The monopsony model has not motivated much recent
work, perhaps because there is little evidence that it is important in modern-
2
day low-wage labor markets (West and McKee, 1980b).
C.'Shock" Effects
Ifemployers do not minimize costs, there is the possibility that
they will respond to a minimum wage increase by raising the productivityPage 6
of their operation to offset the increase (Lloyd Reynoldsand Peter
Gregory, 1965, p. 193). This possibility is oftenlabeled a 'shock"
effect —-theminimum ushocksl employers into greater productivity.
Such a shock effect might reduce the disernployment from a minimum
wage (increase) but is unlikelyto eliminate it (West and McKee,
1980b).First, while some firms may be in a position totake advantage
of previously unrealized economies, other firms may notbe so fortu-
nate. Surveys of employers find reports of such responsesfrom some
but not all firms (U.S. Department of Labor, 1959b).Second,firms may
have failed to minimize costs by using too much labor atthe previous
wage W0; cost-cutting would,thentake the form of discharging (or not
replacing) the extra workers.
Presumably, the scenario most favorable to theshock argument is
the employer being able to call forth greater levelsof effort in re-
sponse to the minimum. A formalmodel consistent with cost-minimizing
employer behavior along these lines has beendeveloped by John Petten
gill (1981). Just as rent controls are thoughtto induce landlords to
lower apartment quality in response to excess demand,competitive
employers may raise the required level ofeffort in response to mini-
mum-wage-induced excess supply. Higher effortlevels can offset the
effective increase in the minimum wage, depending on a parameterwhich
tells how much workers will increase effort at Wmrather than not work
• at all.3 For what appear to be plausiblevaluesof this parameter, effort
reductions can offset much of the disemploymenteffect which wouldPage 7
otherwise occur.4
D. Two-Sector Model
Coverage under the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act has increased gradually, but even today it is not complete.
Since the 1977 Amendments to the Act, roughly 84 percent of all private non-
farm nonsupervisory wage and salary workers have been subject to the minimum
wage, compared with 53 percent in 1950 (Welch, 1978, p.3). Roughly 80 percent
of low-wage workers (those with wages at or below the minimum) work in estab-
lishments subject to the minimum wage (Curtis Gilroy,1981). Thus it makes sense
to consider a model in which coverage is incomplete, particularly in
studying effects of the minimum wage in earlier periods when coverage
was less extensive than it is today.
In Welch's (1974) model of a partial-coverage minimum wage, the
covered sector reacts to the minimum as it would if coverage were
universal. Workers displaced by the minimum wage "migrate" to the un-
covered sector, shifting supply there outward. As a result, wages fall
and employment increases in the uncovered sector.
Those displaced from the covered sector do not automatically
become employed in the uncovered sector. As wages in the uncovered
sector fall, some of those displaced by the minimum wage (as well as
some of those originally employed in the uncovered sector) decide
not to work in the uncovered sector because the wage there is less
than their reservation wage. Therefore, the effect of the minimum wagePage 8
ontotalemployment dependsontheelasticity of labor supply and
thereservation wages of those who do not obtain covered sector work,
as well as more obvious factors such as the size of thecovered sector
and the elasticity of labor demand.
Let S and D denote supply and demand, let the subscripts c
and u refer to covered and uncovered industries, and let c be the
proportion of employment before the minimum wage which is inindustries
about to become subject to it; i.e.,
(1) c =Dc(Wo)/[Dc(Wo)
+
Beforethe minimum wage is introduced, wages in the two sectors are
equal, and the supply of labor in the uncovered sector, (1—c) S(W0),
equals demand in the uncovered sector, Du(Wo)
Welch assumes that, after the minimum wage is introduced, each of the
S(Wm) workers willing to work at the minimum wagehas the same probability
of obtaining one of the Dc(Wm) covered sector jobs. Therefore, this
probability equals
(2) f =Dc(Wm)/S(Wm)
If wages are measured so that W0=l and ln(W0)0, the proportional increase
in the wage in the covered sector is ln(Wm)• The uncovered wage W must now
equate the new uncovered sector supplyS(W) =S(W)(l_f),withdemand, D(W),
After solving for W, one can find the overall level of
employment (covered and uncovered sectors contined) as afunction of
the parameters r, ,c,and Wm• If we measure employment so
that E0 =1,the minimum wage elasticity ofPage 9
employment m £fl(E)/ifl(W) is equal to
CC 9fl(Wm)/tl_C+c2fl(W 1]. Notethat
while is proportional to the demand elasticity q, it is not likely
to be close to q. If t0, rim =0:covered-sector employment losses are
exactly offset by uncovered sector gains. As c increases, so does
approaching c as c approaches infinity. For "reasonable" values of
the parameters, m can be much less than '; e.g., if c.7, £rI(W)=6
c.3, and q=-]..O, m26
A more convenient but perhaps less plausible assumption is that
those with the lowest reservation wages find covered-sector employ-
ment.In this case, S,(W)= S(W) -Dc(Wm)
and the employment elas-
ticity m equals cc/[c-(1-c)q]. Thus, m no longer varies with the
proportional wage increase for covered-sector workers Wm It remains
true that < —cq, approaching —cq as c becomes larger. For the
"reasonable" values used earlier, m equals only -.35. As one would
expect, the disemployment effect is larger as coverage c is increased.
E.Two-Sector Model with Queueing for Covered-Sector Jobs
Neither the simplest supply-demand model nor Welch's two-sector
extension relate the minimum wage to unemployment. Jacob Mincer (1976)
and Edward Gramlich (1976) provide such a link, by considering a
fourth labor market status, remaining unemployed while searching for
covered-sector employment, in addition to the three statuses identi-
fied by Welch (covered and uncovered employment, and labor forcePage io
nonparticipation). They assume that workers choose the sector which
offers the highest expected wage. Those workers who choose the covered
sector receive Wm if they are employed; if P is the probability of
being employed, the expected wage in the covered sector is PWm (Gram-
lich [1976] allows transfers of rWm to the unemployed, so the expected
wage becomes [P +r(lP)]Wm.)
P depends on the number of unemployed
looking for covered-sector jobs, U, relative to covered employment:
(3) p =[l +
InGramlich's model, a equals one. Although Mincer argues that a>1,
Gramlich's assumption is easiest to rationalize. If there is complete turn-
over(i.e.aCh covered-sector job is filled anew in any period),each of
the workers employed in the covered sector and the U unemployed
workers looking for such jobs have identical probabilities of being
employed in the covered sector in any period. That
probability equals D/(U +Dr).
which simplifies to (3) with a1.
Because the model includes no barriers to uncovered-sector employment,
expected wages in the uncovered sector are equal to W.5 In equili-
brium, expected wages in the two sectors must be equal:
(4) PW =W
The supply of labor, which is equal to the number of labor force
participants, depends on expected wages of labor market participants;
by equation (4) this just equals W. By definition, this supply of




The three equations (3)-(5) can be solved for the three endogenous
variables W, P, and U, as functions ofWm and, implicitly, c. With no
minimum wage, UO and labor force and employment are equal. Once
again measure employment so that this initial level of employment is
one. If one assumes that demand elasticities in the two sectors are
equal, the resulting expression for the logarithm of total employment
is:
(6) £n E =[c(+1/cY)q]/[E+c/cY-(1-c)qJ£n Wm
f employment
The minimum wage elasticity m again less than ri in absolute value;
for a1 and the parameter values used earlier,m equals -.7 when
rp-1. Not surprisingly, more complete coverage intensifies disemploy-
ment effects.
The model can also be solved for the level or rate of unemployment.
The unemployment rate is the ratio of unemployed to labor force participants,
the latter given by equation (5):
(7)U/S(W) =[c(-q))/[c+c-a(1-c)q]£n Wm
Thus, the measured unemployment rate is an increasing function of the minimum
wage and (as can be seen by differentiating equation (7) with respect to c) anPage 12
increasing function of c.
One can show that the uncovered-sector wage rises if r+l/ is
positive and falls otherwise. Since this is the expected wage in
both sectors, it is a convenient measure of the effect on those who
remainemployed. If Wu rises (because workers leaving uncovered jobs
to queue in the covered sector dominate the influx of workers from
the covered sector),additional workers enter the labor market,
If W fails,workers leave the labor force and measured unem-
ployment is less than the employment reduction due to theminimum
wage. If W does rise, it rises by a smaller proportionthan Wm.
While the Mincer-Gramlich approach adds unemployment --inter-
preted as queueing for covered-sector jobs --tothe two sector model,
it makes the overly strong assumption that one cannot search for
S
covered-sectorjobs while employed in the uncovered sector. If thetwo
sectors are geographically separate, as might be true in developing
countries (Michael Todaro, 1969), this assumption would be realistic.
In the U.S., where coverage depends on industry and firm orestablish
inent size, covered and uncovered establishments may be next doorto
each other.
The simplest generalization of the Mincer-Gramlich model would
allow those in the labor force two strategies. One strategyis to
search for covered employment if not employed in the covered sector;
the other is to work in the uncovered sector (perhaps searchingfor
covered-sector work) if not employed in the covered sector. Thefirst
strategy gives a probability P of being employed inthe covered sec-
tor, and a probability 1-P of being unemployed. The second strategyPage 13
gives a lower probability of covered-sector work, BP (B<I), and thus
a probability of working in the uncovered sector equal to l-BP.
In general, this extension produces few unexpected conclusions.
Larger values of B reduce the effect of the minimum wage on both
employment and unemployment. This is because, as B increases, uncovered
employment becomes more attractive compared with full-time search for
a covered-sector job (unemployment). Perhaps the most surprising result isPage 14
that, while 8=0 corresponds to the Mincer-Gramlich model, there does
not appear to be a special case corresponding to the Welch model. This
is because, regardless of the parameters, the attractiveness of the two
strategies are equalized in the Mincer-Gramlich model, whereas covered
jobsarerationed (by an unspecified mechanism) in Welch's model.
Whilethe idea of queueing unemployment certainly corresponds
moreclosely to the official concept than the supply—demand gap in the
simplestmodel, the distinction between nonparticipation and unemploy-
ment is much sharper in the model than in the real world. Kim Clark
and Lawrence Summers (1979, p. 9), for example, argue that many young
people are not actively searching for work but are willing to work if
anopportunity is presented.
F.Heterogeneous Workers
Whilethe theory outlined so far captures important aspects of
the relationship between the minimum wage and employment, its applica-
bility to empirical work is limited by the focus on a homogeneous
group of workers earning the minimum wage. Given available data,
empirical work has focused on groups of workers (usually demographic
groups such as teenagers) in which a significant fraction earns more
than the minimum wage --andtherefore is not "directly" affected by
it. Models of labor markets with heterogeneous workers have been a
subject of much recent work among labor economists in general, and the
minimum wage literature is starting to reflect that development.Page 15
The simplest heterogeneous-worker model allows for two types of
workers, one of whom initially earns less than the new minimum wage.
Let the subscripts 1 and 2 denote the directly affected low-wage and
higher-wage workers, respectively, and let h be the proportion of
workers who are initially in group 1. Group 1 workers receivewhile
group 2 workers receive W2. For simplicity, the effect of on both
and output produced is neglected. This is a reasonable simplification
where minimum wage workers are a fairly small proportion of the workforce.
Finally, assume that group 1 workers are substitutes for both group 2
workers and the composite nonlabor input.
The key question is the relationship between the elasticity
of E1-FE2 with respect to Wm (which is what is typically estimated), and
the elasticity of with respect to Wm (which corresponds to the
conventional own-price elasticity of demand for group 1 workers).
Clearly, p1+2 will be less in absolute value thanr1, because group 2
workers' employment is increased by the minimum wage. The assumptions




This simple model suggests that, in comparing effects of minimum
wages on employment of different demographic groups, those with a
larger share of minimum wage workers (larger h) will face more severe
disemployment. Thus, it is frequently predicted that minimum wage laws
will have more negative effects on black teenagers than white teen-
agers, because a larger proportion of the black teenagers would be
directly affected by the minimum wage.
An alternative model assumes a distribution of wages which mir-
rors the distribution of worker skill in the absence of the minimum
wage. In the presence of the minimum wage, those with value of mar-
ginal product below that minimum are not employed, and the distribu-
tion of wages is truncated at the minimum (Marvin Kosters and Welch,
1972).
John Abowd and Mark Killinqsworth (1981) generalize th two-skillPage 17
model by allowing for covered and uncovered sectors, withlow-wage
workers faced with the same choices as in the Mincer-Grarnijchmodel,
and by allowing W to change in response to the minimumwage. They 2
provideapproximate reduced-form expressions for changes in employment
of the two types of workers separately, but even theseapproximations
prove quite cumbersome.
Two recent models of the minimum wage with heterogeneous workers
(James Heckman and Guilherme Sedlacek, 1981; and Pettengill, 1981)
allow for continuous distributions of worker skill, and hence relate
the minimum wage to the wage distribution as well as to the level of
employment.
Heckman and Sedlacek (1981) assume workers have two kinds of skill,one
which is useful in each sector. Thesetwo skills may be positively ornega-
tively correlated acrosworkers. A workeris offered a wage in the covered
sector W equal to the price of skill in the covered sector, times the
covered-sector
number of units of ,skillpossessed by the worker; offered uncov-
ered-sector wages are determined analogously. Each worker chooses
the sector where his offered wage is highest, so aggregate supplies of
skill to each sector depend on the relative prices of the two skills.
Employers hire skill to the point where the value of the marginal pro-
duct of skill is equal to its price.
A minimum wage would, if skill prices were fixed, lead covered-
sector employers to discharge all workers earning less than the mini-
mum, W <WmHowever, this isequivalentto a reduced supply of skillPage 18
in the covered sector, which leads to an increase in its price. The
increased price of covered-sector skill raises the offered wage of
some of those not employable with a minimum wage at the old skill
price up to or above the minimum (i.e., they are "re-employed") and
attracts some of those initially employed in the uncovered sector
(those for whom was "slightly" below Wu at the initial skill
prices). The price of skill in the uncovered sector may rise or fall,
but must fall relative to the price of covered sector skill. This is
analogous to the result for covered and uncovered wages with homogene-
ous workers.
In order to limit the complexity of the model, Heckman and
Sedlacek assume that each industry uses only one skill and that
output depends on the simple sum of the skill levels employed. This im-
poses a very strong conclusion: wages of all workers who remain in an in—Page 19
dustry Increase (or decrease) by the same proportion in response to
t-the minimum. This contradicts the conventional wisdom on the subject,
which holds that such wage changes are largest for those initiallyjust
above the minimum.?
Pettengill's (1981) model also focuses on the continuous distri-
bution of worker qualities. As in the Heckman-Sedlacek model, worker
quality is taken as predetermined, and workers seek the employment
opportunity offering the highest wage. However, each worker has a
unique quality (skill) ranking q,rather thana set of (possibly
negatively correlated) skifls.
The demand side of the market is also quite different. Industries
are identified with a continuous distribution of production "tasks"
which differ in their sensitivity to worker quality. While a higher-rated
worker is assumed more productive than a lower-ratedone on all tasks,
the relative productivity of the higher-rated worker will be largest
on the tasks with the greatest quality sensitivity. Competition insures that
the highest quality workers are employed to perform the highest qual-
ity tasks. Substitutability between different types of labor is not
explicitly modelled, but is implicit in the notion of tasks arrayed
according to their quality sensitivity. The minimum wage is seen asPage 20
eliminating the lowest-quality labor from the market, which potentially
alters the entire wage distribution. The resulting level of employment
and distribution of wages depend on the elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital on each task and the elasticity of demand
for output on each task (both of these elasticities are assumed constant
across tasks), the elasticity of supply of each quality of labor, labor's
share of total income, and the rate at which quality sensitivity varies
across tasks.
Effects of the minimum wage must be calculated numerically, since
no reduced-form employment equation can be derived. For a full—coverage
minimum wage set at 55 percent of the median wage, the results are
surprisingly insensitive to the wide range of parameters chosen.
Total employment declines by 6 to 10 percent, and the wage of the
lowest quality worker who remains employed rises 7 to 20 percent
above its pre-minimum level. This wage increase is analogous to
Heckman and Sedlacek's increased price of covered-sector skill,
but wage increases diminish as one considers successively higher—
quality workers. Pettengill also considers a partial—coverage minimumPage 21
wage and endogenous worker effort; as noted earlier, these greatly
reduce the calculated disemployment.
With worker effort endogenous, different quality workerscan re-
ceive the same (minimum) wage, because greater effort isrequired of
the lower-quality workers. Thus, this version of the modelpredicts a
spike in the wage distribution at. the minimum wage. That spike is a
striking feature of observed wage distributions8 and is not explained
by most competing models including those which emphasize truncation at
the minimum wage (Kosters and Welch, 1972; Hecknan and Sedlacek,
1981).
G. Lagged Adjustment
While lagged adjustment is often assumed in empirical studies of
the effect of the minimum wage, the theory underlying this assumption
is virtually undiscussed. Lagged adjustments to minimumwage increases
are probably less plausible than in most other contexts where such
lags are routinely assumed.
One important consideration is the fact that plausible adjust-
ments in employment of minimum wage workers can be accomplished simply
by reducing the rate at which replacements for normal turnover are
hired. Employers report that separation rates among minimumwage
workers averaged 13 percent per month ( Converse,et al., 1981).
Of course, inability to adjust other inputs instantaneously would
create lagged responses in employment of even a perfectly flexiblePaye 22
input (M. Ishaq Nadiri and Sherwin Rosen, 1969, p. 462). Itis not
clear, however, that the required adjustments of other inputs are
large enough to generate appreciable lags. Let subscript 1 denote
minimum wage labor and 2 refer to the composite of other inputs.
and let k1,012 and g be input l's share of costs, the elasticity of
substitution, and the elasticity of demand for output, respectively. Then the
proportional change in demand for input 2 equals k1(S12-g) times the
proportional change in the minimum wage. Since k1 is quite small,'0
and the demand elasticity g offsets at least part of the substitution
toward input 2, the indicated change in other inputs is likely to be
smal 1.
A final consideration is the fact that minimum wage increases are
enacted months or even years before they take effect.11 Thus, "leads"
are as plausible as "lags," and the lag may be very short.
H. Welfare Effects
The effect of the minimum wage in the simplest competitive market is
straightforward: employment is reduced, and the efficiency of the labor
market is impaired, because some individuals whose marginal product exceeds
their reservation wage are unable to work. Under monopsony, a minimum
wage could increase employment and enhance the efficiency of the labor
market.
The remaining models often identify factors which could reduce the
disemployment effects of a minimum wage-- improved managerial efficiencyPage 23
(or additional worker effort), movement from the covered to the
uncovered sector, or (partially) offsetting increases in employment
of better-paid workers. Each of these mitigating factors, however,
has a welfare cost of its own. For example, workers displaced
into the uncovered sector end up working in jobs where their marginal
product is less than it was in the covered sector. Thus, a zero em-
ployment loss would not imply that welfare costs were negligible. The
welfare economics of these more complicated models has not received
much formal development. As we shall see, the more refined models of
minimum wage effects have served to interpret the empirical results,
but the estimating equations have rarely served to identify the re-
finements (e.g. ,thesupply and demand elasticities embedded in equa-
tion 6 are not separately identified). Thus, even if formal welfare
treatments were available, key parameter estimates would be largely
conjectural.Page 24
II. TIME-SERiES STUDIES OF TEENAGERS AND YOUTH
Most of the time-series studies present estimates of minimum wage
effects only for youth and some oniy for teenagers. These groups are
most often disaggregated by age (16-17, 18-19, and 20-24 years), sex,
and race. Peter Mattila (1978 and 1981) and James Ragan (1977 and
1981) further disaggregate by school enrollment status. Gramlich
(1976) estimates effects on full- and part-time workers separately
while Welch (1976),12 Daniel Hamermesh (1981), and Robert Cotterman
(1981) consider the distribution of employment of teenagers by indus-
try. However, limitations of time-series data have precluded disaggre
gation by region and detailed industry.
A. Basic Equations Estimated
Time-series studies which attempt to estimate the effect of mini-
mum wages on the labor force status of youth have relied upon single
equation models of the type
Y =f(MW,0, X1... X)
where the dependent variable Y is a measure of labor force status. In-
dependent variables include MW as a measure of the minimum wage; 0 as
an aggregate demand (business cycle) variable to account for changes
• in the level of economic activity; and X1. .. Xrepresenting a host of
other exogenous explanatory variables to control for labor supply,Page 25
school enrollment, participation in the armed forces, and the like
(Table 1).
To measure the "employment effect" of the minimum wage, the ratio
of employment to population is used most often as the dependent vari-
able. "Unemployment effects" are usually measured as the effect of the
minimum wage on the proportion of the labor force (or of the popula-
tion) unemployed. Unemployment equations were a characteristic of the
earlier studies; the more recent research ha5 estimated the effects of
the minimum wage on the employment-population and labor force-popula-
tion ratios, and has derived the unemployment effects from these.
Several of the most recent studies (Abowd and Killingsort'., 1981; Charles Betsey
and Bruce Dunson, 1980; John Boschen and Herschel Grossman, 1981; and Hamer-
mesh,198l) focus on employment effects to the exclusion of any unem-
ployment considerations. The shift in emphasis from "unemployment" to
"employment" effects is important. In our view, it is a positive
development, for four reasons.
First, the "employment" effects more nearly measure the extent of
harm if the minimum wage does restrict job opportunities. Suppose that
an increase in the minimum wage were known to have reduced employment
by 10 jobs, compared with what employment would otherwise have been.
Some of those who would otherwise have been employed may give up look-
ing for jobs, and hence not be counted as "unemployed." But the harm
done is not reduced on this account. Furthermore, if additional mdi-
viduals enter the labor force to search for the now-more-attractivePage 26
jobs (leading unemployment to increase by more than 10), the harm of
the job-loss is not increased. Consequently, the "employment effects"
more nearly measure the "cost' of the minimum wage in terms of job
opportunities.
Second, the concept of unemployment is not precise, simply be-
cause the job search process is necessarily nebulous. While the offi-
cial classification of individuals as employed is quite straightfor-
ward, the classification of persons as unemployed depends upon their
having made some active effort (however serious) to seek work within
the past four weeks. In other words, the line between unemployment and
not-in-the labor force is not well drawn. Hyman Kaitz (1970) and Alan
Fisher (1973) make this point explicitly.
Third, focusing on employment status allows one to distinguish
between full-time and part-time employment. However, the impact of the
minimum wage on length of workweek has received relatively little at-
tention in the literature.13
Finally, the changes in the methods for measuring labor force
status introduced to the Current Population Survey (CPS) in 1967 af-
fected the count of the unemployed significantly more than that of the
employed (Robert Stein, 1967).14 This discontinuity in the unemploy-
ment series renders the unemployment effect estimates less reliable
than the estimates of employment effects.
The key variable, minimum wage, has generally been measured by
the ratio of the nominal legal minimum wage to average hourly earningsPage 27
weighted by coverage, as devised by Kaitz (1970). Ratios of minimum
wage rates to average hourly earnings are calculated for each indus-
try, weighted by the proportion of workers covered. These are combined
into an index in which the weight for each industry ratio is the
number of persons employed in the industry as a proportion of total





MW basic minimum wage rate
AHE average hourly earnings of nonsupervisory workers
C =proportionof nonsupervisory workers covered by the
basic minimum wage rate
= minimumwage rate for newly covered workers
C =proportionof nonsupervisory employees covered by the
minimum wage applicable to newly covered workers
i =majorindustry division
t =totalprivate nonagricultural economy
Most studies which use this index use teenage employment ratios as
weights.
The Kaitz index has the advantage of summarizing a great deal ofPage 28
information about the minimum wage law in a single variable. Consis-
tent with the models discussed in Section I, it includes information
about both the relative level of the minimum wage compared with mar-
ket-determined wages and the degree of coverage; it also reflects the
existence of lower minimums in newly covered industries. It thus seems
superior to three alternatives which have appeared in the literature-—
dummy variables for changes in the level or coverage of the minimum
wage (Hugh Folk, 1968; James Easley and Robert Fern, 1969; Peter
Barth, 1969; and Yale Brozen, 1969),' the "real" minimum wage (Doug-
las Adie and Gene Chapin, 1970; Adie, 1973; Gramlich, 1976; and Abowd
and Killingsworth, 1981), or the ratio of the minimum wage to average
hourly earnings ignoring coverage (Arthur Burns, 1966; Lester Thurow,
1969; and Adie, 1971). As a result, most studies have used the Kaitz
index, or some variant of it, to represent the provisions of minimum
wage laws.16
Hamermesh (1981) departs from the standard Kaitz index in two
quite different ways. First, he uses an estimate of average hourly
earnings of teenagers instead of an economy-wide average in the rela-
tive minimum wage portion of the index. (He then includes the teen!
adult average wage ratio as a separate variable. )1? Second, he cor-
rects hourly wage data to better reflect hourly compensation by in-
cluding costs such as Social Security taxes, pension contributions,
vacation pay, and training, and corrects the minimum wage for the
flrst two factors.Page 29
An alternative strategy is to include separate measures of the
level and coverage of the minimum wage. As Gramlich (1976) has ob-
served, the Kaitz variable assumes that a 10 percent increase in the
level of the minimum wage has the same effect as a 10percent increase
in coverage --anassumption which has no theoretical justification.
Fisher (1973) also argues against using a variable which makes these
separate effects indistinguishable. As a statistical matter, however,
the tendency for minimum wage increases andcoverage extensions to
occur simultaneously makes separate estimation of level andcoverage
effects difficult.
The business cycle variable common to all studies is ameasure of
the overall demand for labor, although many proxies are used: adult
unemployment or prime-age male unemployment rates, the Federal Reserve
gap between actual and potential GNP.
Board's index of industrial production, and the / Thereis wide
variation in the choice of other control variables in these studies.
Nearly three quarters of the studies use a time trend variable. Half
of the studies incorporate a variable to control for participation in
the armed forces as well as an overall potential labor supply vari-
able, most often measured by the ratio of a particular group's popula-
tion to the total working-age population. About one third of the
studies control for school enrollment and/or participation in employ-
ment and training programs (Table 1).
The most extensive discussion has focused on the inclusion of the
youth population share variable. Adie and Gallaway (1973) and Fisher(1973)Page 30
have argued that this variable should not be included in either employment
or unemployment equations estimating minimum wage effects. Because the simple
supply-demand model suggests that employment is demand-determined in
the presence of the minimum wage, excess labor supply is irrelevant;
as a result, supply side variables (such as the population share) do not
belong in the employment equation. Furthermore, because supply and demand
would equilibrate in the absence of the minimum wage, increases in the
supply of teenagers which increase teenage unemployment are really
"minimum wage" effects as well, and are mistakenly attributed to the
impact of supply-side variables.
Once the overly restrictive assumptions of the simple model are
relaxed, this view loses much of its attractiveness. For example, the
view that employment of teenagers is demand-determined may be correct
for the half of teenagers who earn the minimum wage, but is difficult
to accept for the remaining half who earn more than the minimum. Their
employment must depend on the relative supply as well as the demand
for teenage labor. Morever, even if the demand-determination argument
were correct, including truly exogenous supply-side variables would
not bias the minimum wage coefficient in the employment equation,
although the precision with which it can be estimated may be reduced
• to some degree.'8
Excluding supply-determining variables from equations explainingPage 31
teenage unemployment also seems incorrect. Contrary to the apparent
message of the simplest supply-demand model, some teenagers would still
be counted as unemployed in the absenceof the minimum wage (Michael
Lovell,1973; pp. 531—2; Goldfarb, 1974; pp. 264-5), as is obvious
from the unemployment statistics of teenagers who ordinarily earn more
than the minimum. Hence, the extent of unemployment not caused by the
minimum wage must be held constant, and including variables which
reflect relative supplies is necessary. This does, perhaps, introduce
some ambiguity into estimates of the effect of the minimum wage on
teenage unemployment --howmuch teenage unemployment would be reduced
if the minimum wage were repealed. However, the relevant policy issue
is the effect of marginal changes in the minimum wage, and holding the
relative supply of teenagers constant is certainly necessary to make
that evaluation.19
The majority of studies use quarterly observations. This permits
the capture of short-term cyclical fluctuations in aggregate demand
(considerably more difficult with annual data) and mitigates the
adverse effects of severe short-term variations in the values of
variables, particularly sampling variation for small age-sex-race
cells (a characteristic of monthly data). Linear and double-log speci-
fications (in which the logarithm of the dependent variable depends on
the logarithm of the minimum wage variable) are about equally common.
About one half employ some form of lag structure in their analyses.
All studies use labor force data from the Current PopulationPage 32
Survey. As a result, one could argue that there really are not 25 in-
dependent studies. Since the earlier studies include about 15 years of
data and the later studies about 25, the later ones can be thought of
as replications of the earlier ones. However, subtle differences exist
in the variables included, the form they take, functional form of the
equation, and lag or lead structure utilized.
While most studies present estimates for several subgroups (nec-
essitating the aggregation discussed below'), most present only one
specification. Where more than one specification was presented, we
have tried to include the one which seemed most preferred by the




Only the findings of those studies which attempt to measure the
employment and/or unemployment effects of a minimum wage are reported
here. In order to enhance the comparability of these studies, their
results are displayed in terms of elasticities for employment and
percentage point increases for the unemployment rate. To measure
employment effects, Tables 2 and 3 present the percent change in
employment due to a 10-percent change in the minimum wage; i.e. ,10
• times the employment elasticity of the minimum wage ri(E). For studies
which regress the logarithm of an employment measure (the employment-
population ratio (E/P), for example) on the logarithm of the minimumPage 33
wage (W), the coefficient of the minimum wage variable is simply
q(E). For studies which use a linear rather than a double-logarithmic
specification, q(E) equals the regression coefficient times
where the bar indicates the mean value over the sample period.
To further enhance comparability of results, severaltypes of
aggregation are necessary, particularly in calculating impacts for all
teenagers in Table 3: combining (1)separateestimates for 16-17 and
18-19 year olds when estimates for the 16-19group are not presented; (2) esti-
mates fordiffnt race-sex groups when results for teenagersas a
whole are not reported; and (3) separate estimates for enrolled and
non-enrolled individuals. For any two groups, elasticities
are aggregated according to the formula:
q(E1+E2) = (1-) ri(E2)
where
E1/(E1+E2)
The unemployment effects in Tables 2 and 3 represent the change
in the unemployment rate due to a 10-percent change in the minimum
wage. For example, a .500 would indicate that a minimum wage increase
of 10 percent is estimated to raise the unemployment rate from,say,
6.0 to 6.5 percent. For the studies which estimate separate employment
and labor force equations in logarithmic form using the employment-
• population ratio (E/P) and labor force participation rate (LIP) as
• dependent variables, the minimumwage coefficients are the employment
and labor force elasticities q(E) and r(L). Where the equations arePage 34
linear, the regression coefficients must be multiplied by Wm/(E/P)and
Wm/(iJ) respectively, to derive q(E)and q(L). The impact, x, of a






=theimpact on the unemployment rate (in percentage
points) of a 1 percent change in theminimum wage
Thus, if the minimum wage increases by 10 percent (Wm/Wm
=.10),
tLJ expressed as a decimal is .lOx, andthe change in the unemployment
rate in percentage pointsis lOx. For studies in which the dependent
variable is the unemployment rate expressed in percentage
points, x is
calculated as the regression coefficient for theminimum wage multi-
plied by m• Just as the employmentelasticities were aggregated as
described earlier, so the labor force elasticities weresimilarly
weighted using labor force shares.
On balance, the effects of a 10-percentincrease in the minimum
wage are estimated to resultin about a 1-3 percent reduction in total
teenage employment (Table 3).All studies find a negative employment
effect for all teenagers together, and the signs arealmost exclu
sively negative for the various age-sex-racesubgroups. Since it is
necessary to compute many ofthe overall "effects" from the disaggrePage 35
gated equations, it is not possible to conduct tests to determine
whether they are statistically significant. The coefficients from
these disaggregated equations are mostly negative, with about half
being statistically significant.
Although the research is consistent in finding some employment
reduction associated with minimum wage increases, the estimated ef-
fects on unemployment appear to be considerably more varied. Of parti-
cular note are the large positive unemployment effects estimated by
Adie (1971) and Thomas Moore (1971) on the one hand, and the
negative unemployment effects estimated by Lovell (1973) on
the other in response to a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage.
Yet, excluding these studies, the unemployment effects for all
teenagers of the remaining nine studies reported in Table 3 are within
a relatively narrow band --rangingfrom very small negative effects
(virtually zero) to 0.75 percentage point. Implicitly or explicitly,
studies finding disemployment effects but little or no unemployment
impacts are finding labor-force withdrawal in response to minimum
wage increases.
"Wrong-signed"coefficients are somewhat more comon among the
demographic subgroups in Tables 2 and 3forthe unemployment effects
thanwas true for the employment effects. Because many of the unem-
ployment effects are calculated from employment and labor force equa-
ttons, their statistical significance could not be determined.
It is extraordinarily difficult to determine a few critical
specification choices which explain the range of results. The over-Page 36
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whelmingmajority of the studies in Tables 2and3 contain no sensiti-
vity analyses whatsoever. Moreover, the limited evidence available
suggests that the effects of various choices are not necessarily
additive —-howthe results are affected by one choicemay depend on
howanotherchoice has been resolved.
The sample period chosen seems to have relatively minor effects
on the estimated employment impacts. Both Hamermesh (1981) and Charles
Brown, Curtis Gilroy, and Andrew Kohen (1981) report that the esti-
mates are not appreciably affected by extending thesample period from
1954-69 (roughly the sample period of the eight earliest studies in
Table 1) with more recent data. However, Betsey and Dunson(1981) find
considerably smaller effects over the full sample period than in the
earlier period alone. There is a tendency for unemployment effects to
be smaller in studies using data which includes the experience of the
1970s, although the differences between the three largest estimates
(Moore, 1971; Adie, 1971 and 1973) and the others in Table 3 is prob-
ably due to other differences as well (see below).
The treatment of coverage has led to some interesting, if dis-
turbing, results. Of those studies which allow for separate estimates of
the effects of changing the level of the minimumand the proportion of
workers covered, the generaltendency is for coverage effects to be
weaker, both in statistical significance and magnitude (Moore,1971;
Gramlich, 1976; Boschen and Grossman, 1981; Brown, Gilroy andKohen,
1981; an exception is Al-Salam, Quester, and Welch, 1981). The m-
precision of the estimates does not allow for confidentrejection ofPage 37
the Kaitz restriction, or of the hypothesis that coverage effects are
zero. Studies which ignore coverage altogether in creating the minimum
wage variable (Freeman, 1979; Wadter and Kim, 1979; and Abowd and
Killingsworth, 1981) tend to report larger estimated employment ef-
fects, but we can see no justification for this omission.21 Harnermesh
(1981) concludes that his refinements of the Kaitz index have little
impact on the estimated effect of the minimum wage.
Given the wide variation in control variables which reflect the
supply or composition of teenage labor, relatively few confident
judgments can be made about the impact of these supply-side control
variables on the estimated effects of the minimum wage on employment.
Betsey and Dunson (1981) report that controlling for welfare benefits
reduces estimated minimum wage impacts, although the resulting esti-
mates are not very stable across sample periods.22 Al-Salarn, Quester,
and Welch (1981) note that the estimated minimum wage effects are
higher (by about -0.5 in the measure in Table 3) when three 11potenti-
ally endogenous" factors (fraction of teenagers in training programs, in school,
or in the armed forces) are not held constant. Abowd and Killings-
worth (1981) find little impact of including or excluding training
enrollments, while Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1981) find that the
estimates are insignificantly affected by adding or deleting these or
similar variables, at least with a double-log functional form.23 Ragan
(1977 and 1981) and Mattila (1978 and 1981) control for school en-
rollment, either directly or with exogenous variables thought toPage 38
affect the enrollment decision, and their estimates are among the
smaller ones in the literature.
Control variables appear to be mere of a factor in t.fe unrnploy-
ment equations. Lovell (1973) reports that nearly the entire differ-
ence between his estimates and those of Moore (1971, pp. 534-5) are
due to his including the teen population share as a control variable.
In general, the results of others confirm this conclusion. Four of the
five largest unemployment estimates appear in studies which exclude
the population share (Adie, 1971 and 1973; Moore, 1971, who includes
the share variable only in the nonwhite equation; Hashimoto and
Mincer, 1970) while the five smallest estimates are all found in
studies which include it (Kaitz. 1970; Lovell, 1972 and 1973; Freeman,
1979; and Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen, 1981). However, the results appear
less sensitive to this specification choice as the sample period is
extended. 24
Table3 also reveals few differences between those studies which
assume that the effect of the minimum wage is instantaneous and those
25
whichassume a lagged response (usually of the Almon lag form).
Soschen and Grossman argue that responses to the minimum wage should
depend on future values of the minimum wage and coverage, both in-
creases which are announced in advance and the expected values of the
minimum when increases have not been announced. Empirically, they
assume that next year's value of the minimum is known, and beyond one
year, the ratio of the minimum wage to average wages is expected
to equal the average value of this ratio over thePage 39
sample period. The combined effect of a change in current and
next—year values can be calculated from their coefficients; it
is shown in Table 3, and is not very different from the median value
in the table. The "long-run" impact of a "permanent" change is not
calculated.
Because it is difficult to explain the range of estimates in the
literature by a few critical specification choices, it is not easy to
produce a "best' estimate of the employment and unemployment effects.
We are inclined to assign greater weight to those papers which include
a significant portion of the experience of the 1970s in the sample,
include coverage (either separately or in the Kaitz form) as well as
the level of the minimurr wage nd control for exogenous factors gov-
erning the relative supply of teenagers. The impact of that preference
is to concentrate the "preferred estimates at the lower end of the
range found in the literature, for both employment and unemployment
effects.
The theory suggests that the disemployment effects would be
larger for those whose wages would otherwise be the lowest --blacks,
women, and young teenagers. Tables 2 and 3 show some tendency for
disemployment and unemployment effects to be more serious for 16-17
year olds than older teenagers; unemployment effects are more often
larger for females than males, but disemployment effects vary the
l
opposite way.
The most often discussed differences among teenagers are thePage 40
black—white comparisons. A narrow majority of the comparisons in Table
3 show larger employment and unemployment effects for blacks. But the
patter is reversed among studies which include the 1970s: Wachter and
Kim (1979) and Iden (1981) find larger minimumwage effects among
blacks than whites; Ragan (1977), Betsey and Dunson (1981) and Brown,
Gilroy and Kohen (1981) find the opposite. Ideri's black and white
equations are not strictly comparable since the time trend variable
(generally significant in minimum wage studies) is not the same in
both equations. These mixed results erode much of the confidence we
place in a black-white or even male-female comparison of minimum wage
effects.
There may also be a problem with the reliability of some of these
estimates because of the relatively small sample size of the popula-
tion and labor force estimates of nonwhites (Welch, 1976,p. 13). More
generally, many of the disaggregated effects cannot be calculated
precisely, and the differences in such effects are likely to be esti-
mated with even less precision.
Since the size of the CPS sample has grown over time, weighting
the observations by the estimated number of nonwhite teenagers
ally surveyed seemed desirable. This would place greater weight on the
more recent observations, which are presumably subject to smaller
sampling errors. Having done this, we found the resulting estimates
to beonly slightly closer to the white teenage results (Brown, Gilroy
and Kohen, 1981).Page 41
While it is often asserted that blacks are more adversely af-
fected than whites by the minimum wage, previous studies provide
conflicting evideice on the issue. In any case, while these studies do
not disprove the claim that nonwhites are more adversely affected, we
would conclude from the body of literature that such an assertion must
rest on theoretical rather than empirical grounds, at least insofar as
the time-series evidence is concerned.
In sunulary, our survey indicates a reduction of between one and
three percent in teenage employment as a result of a 10 percent increase
in the federal minimum waae. We regard the lower part of this range as
most plausible, because this is what most studies which include the
experience of the 1970's and deal carefully with minimum-wage coverage
tend to find. The other consistent finding is a notable withdrawl from
the labor force by teenagers in response to an increased minimum, to
the extent that unemployment effects of the higher minimum are considerably
weaker than the disemployment effects.Page 42
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III.CROSS-SECTION STUDIES OF TEENAGERS
The studies reviewed thus far have relied on differences over
time to estimate minimum wage effects —-howdid employment of teen-
agers change when the minimum wage changed? An alternative approach is
to rely on cross-section data, usually by making comparisons between
states or metropolitan areas which differ in the importance of the
minimum wage.
A basic question which must. be confronted with the cross-section
approach is how one can identify differences in degree of importance
of the minimum wage when, at one point in time, a single Federal mini-
mum wage law applies to all states? If all the observations have the
same value for the "minimum wage variable,' one cannot estimate the
minimum wage's effect. Several answers to this question have been pro-
vided in the literature on youth. Early studies, using 1960 Census
data, asked whether state minimum wage laws lowered teenage employ-
ment. With the extension of Federal minimum wage coverage in retail
trade and services in the 1960s, the importance of state laws was re-
duced, and later studies relied on the argument that the impact of the
Federal minimum depends on average wage levels in the area (high-wage
areas being less affected) and on the extent to which the area's in-
dustries are subject to the Federal law.26
Studies which focus on differences in state laws generally deter-
mine the impactofthese laws on (average) wages of teenagers, and the
Impact of higherwageson teenage employment. The latter impact Isof'Page 43
greater interest for studying effects of Federal minimumwage in-
creases.
Generally speaking, the three studies surveyed (EdwardKalachek,
1969; Arnold Katz, 1973; Paul Osterman, 1979) found thathigher wages
reduced teenage employment; these effectswere fairly small for white
teens (a 10 percent increase inaverage wages reducing their employ-
ment by a few percentage points), butperhaps larger for black teens.
The lack of precision in thissummary reflects the large differences
in estimates among studies.
Cross-section studies of the effect of the Federal minimumwage
are a recent addition to the literature (Table 4). As in the time-
series studies, youth employment is assumed todepend on the minimum
wage, the demand for labor (as reflected in the area unemployment
rate) and other factors. As can be seen from Table 4, thereare sig-
nificant differences between studies in the extent ofattempts to con-
trol for these other factors. Studies which
distinguish between student
and nonstudent employment, or part-time andfull-time employment (Ronald
Ehrenberg and Alan Marcus, 1979; James Cunningham, 1981) include a
more extensive list of control variables.2?
Estimates of the employment effects of a 10 percent change in the
minimum wage based on these cross-section studies arepresented in
Table 5. These estimates vary much more widely than the time-series
• results in Tables 2 and 3.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine which differencesPage 44
among studies are responsible for the different results. As was true
of the time-series analyses reviewed in Section II, the studies rarely
report how their estimates of minimum wage effects are altered by
modifying the list of control variables, or other changes. The one
generalization which appears to be supported by Table 5 is that stud-
ies which attempt to control for many other determinants of youth
employment (Ehrenberg and Marcus, 1979; and Cunningham, 1981) find
smaller minimum wage effects than those which include few controls
(Welch and Cunningham, 1978; Freeman, 1979) for all teenagers (or all
white teenagers). However, this relationship does not hold for indi-
vidual race-sex groups, and there are no indications which control
variables are primarily responsible for these changes.28
Because most of the variation in the 'minimum wage' variable (usually the
fraction of workers covered times the ratio of the minimumwage to average wages)
comes from variation in wage levels across states or areas, one is
usually not certain whether the estimated effects are "minimum wage"
effects or "state average wage effects." As a result, Freeman (1979,
p. 8) concludes that the cross-section approach provides "at most a
weak test of the effect of the minimum." Cunningham (1981) and John
Cogan (1981) provide more reassurance on this score than do the other
studies, because they include the value of the dependent variable from
the previous Census as a control variable.29
Two cross-section studies of teenage employment are not included
In Table 4 because they used quite different approaches to the problem
of estimating the effects of the Minimumwage.Karl Egge !.t !.L.(1970)Page 45
used cross-section data to analyze changes in theemployment status of
young wen before and after the 1967 increase in the Federal minimum
wage. They compared those whose 1966 wage was below the mandated
minimum with other young men whowere, presumably, not affected by the
minimum, Their hypothesis was that if the minimumwage reduced employ-
ment opportunities, those earning less than the new minimumshould
have less favorable changes in employment status.They did not con-
sistently find such a pattern.
Robert Meyer and David Wise (1981) use a quite different
approach to estimating employment effects of the minimum wage,
inferring them from the distribution of wages at one point in
time, They assume that, in the absenceof the minimum wage, the wage
distribution for out—of-school teenagers would begiven by
£n(w)BX +e,
where X 'is a vector of worker characteristics ande is a normally dis-
tributed error term. Assuming thatP1 of those who would have wages
less than the minimum remain in subminimumwage jobs while P2 are
raised to the minimum and(1-P1-P2) are disemployed, they estimate
and B using maximum likelihood methods. They find thata 10 per-
cent increase in the minimum waqe would reduceemployment of nonen-
rolled teenagers by 3.6 percent.
This estimate depends on t.he assumed functional formrelating the
wage to the personal characteristics and on the assumed distribution
• of theerror term. Perhaps the main concern is that even if theMeyer
and Wise model correctly specified the "uncensoredwage distribution,Page 46
censoring of low-wage workers for reasons unrelated to the minimum
wage might distort the distribution in a way which looked (to the eye
and, presumably, to a maximum-likelihood algorithm) like a minimum-
wage induced thinning of the 'ower tail. Teenagers who receive the
lowest offered wages deciding not to work would potentially have
this effect.
It is more difficult to neatly summarize the principal findings
of the cross-section studies than those of the time-series studies.
The range of estimates is wider, and the number of studies smaller. On
the basis of the cross-section studies alone, one is able to say
little with confidence. The broader range of estimated employment
effects does, however, roughly center on the 1—3 percent range which
we found in the time-series studies. In that sense, one can fairly say
that the cross-section evidenc' is not inconsistent with the time-
series estimates.Page 47
IV.THEMINIMUM WAGE AND ADULT EMPLOYMENT
When we turn from teenagers to otherpopulation groups, we find a
dramatic reduction in the number of studiesof minimum wage effects on
employment and unemployment, Those studies whichprovide estimates of
the effect of the minimumwage on young adults (those aged 20-24) show
fairly consistent negative employment effects and positiveunemploy-
ment impacts (Table 6). They tend to find smaller effectsthan those
estimated for teenagers (e.g., generally less thana 1 percent reduc-
tion in their employment inresponse to a 10 percent increase in the
minimum) although the effects vary somewhat across sex-racegroups.
Mincer (1976) and Wachtec and Kim (1979) findlarger effects for black than
white males, but Wachter and Kim find large positiveeffects for black females.
The three available cross-sectional studies ofyoung adults
(Freeman, 1979; Cunningham, 1981; Meyer and Wise, 1981) also find
smaller disemployment effects foryoung adults than they find for
teenagers. However, the range is once again somewhat wider(froni 0.2 to
2.2percent)than in the time-series studies.
As noted in the discussion of the theory of the minimumwage, one
expects to be able to detect effects of the minimum wage most readily
if the group studied contains a relatively large fraction of workers
who would have earned less than the mandatedwage in the absence of
minimum wage legislation. While teenagers and, to a lesserextent,
young adults fit this description, adults generally do not.Asa re-
suit, the minimum wage could increase or reduce adultPage 48
employment and in either
case, the effect may beso small
cajnpared to total adult employment that it will not bedetected with
precision.
Time-series studies on the subjectproduce quite mixed results.
Mincer (1976) reports statisticallysignificant employment reductions
among white males over age 65 and white female adults but not for
other age, sex, and race combinations. Gramlich(1976 pp. 438-443)
finds statistically insignificantreductions for adult males and no
effect for adult females. Hamermesh's(1981) results imply a small and
statistically insignificant increase in adult employment becausethe
minimum wage raises thewages of competing teenagers. Boschen and
Grossman (1981) find that employment of adultwomen is significantly
increased as the level (but not coverage) of theminimum wage is
raised. The only conclusion emerging from thesestudies is that it is
difficult to estimate the effect of the minimumwage on adult employ-
ment with any precision from time-series data.
A cross-section Study by Peter Linneman (1980) adoptsa
quite different approach to estimating adultdisemployment effects.
Given data on wages and other characteristics suchas age and educa-
tion of workers in 1973, he estimate5 thewage such workers would have
earned in 1974, had the minimumwage not been increased. He argues
that those directly affected by t.he minimumwage are those whose
predicted wages would have been less than the new 1974 minimumand
that the negative employment effects should begreatest for thosePage 49
whose predicted wage was furthest below the minimum. Linneman finds
that this was indeed the case. While he does not estimate the overall
reduction in adult employment due to the minimum wage increase, his
results permit the inference that it is substantial.3° However,
Linnernan also finds that those with wages well above the minimum
suffered lower employment than they would have with a
constant minimum wage, while most theoretical predictions would
have yielded the opposite result. This raises the possibility that his
results reflect the fact that low-wage workers are less likely to be
employed without convincingly implicating the minimum wage as a cause
of this problem.31Page 50
V. EVIDENCE FROMLOW-WAGEINDUSTRIES AND AREAS
In contrast to the studies reviewed thus far, which focus on the
effect of the minimum wage on subgroups of the population classified
by individual or demographic characteristics, a smaller set of studies
focuses on the effect of the minimum wage on different industries or
areas. In line with the observation that such effects will be most
reliably detected when a significant fraction of workers in the sample
studied are directly affected by increases in the minimum wage, these
studies focus on low-wage industries or low-wage areas.
Most studies isolate the impact of the minimum wage by comparing
changes in employment, over a period which brackets an increase in the
minimum, between units of observation which differ in the extent to
which wages initially fell below the new minimum. Implicitly, this
assumes that, in the absence of the minimum wage increase, observa-
tions with high concentrations of workers initially paid less than the
new minimum would have experienced roughly the same employment growth
as observations with fewer low-paid workers. As noted below, this
assumption is often open to challenge. Compared to the studies re-
viewed earlier, the studies in this section tend to have fewer ex-
plicit control variables to capture the effect of factors besides the
minimum wage, and so lean more heavily on pre-increase employment to
implicitly control for these differences.Page 51
A. Employment Effects in NewlyCoveredSectors
Most of the six amendments to the FLSA have included changes in
cA.werage of minimum wage workers. The 1961 and 1966 amendments, in
particular, resulted in coverage increases for retail trade and ser-
vices, while the 1966 amendments provided for significant increases
among agricultural workers. Studies which have focused on these low-
wage industrial sectors are reviewed below.
Agriculture. The statutory minimum wage for covered farm workers
has risen in seven steps from $1.00 per hour in February 1967 to
eventual parity with other covered workers at $2.65 in 1978. The
studies which measure the impact of minimum wages on employment in the
agricultural sector build upon earlier econometric analyses of the
farm labor market (G. Edward Schuh, 1962; and Edward Trychniewicz and
Schuh, 1969) and tend to support the competitive hypothesis that
increases in the minimum wage result in adverse employment effects.32
In an aggregate time-series study of U.S. agriculture over the
1946-78 period, Bruce Gardner (1981) finds significant disemployment
effects, with the minimum wage reducing the number of hired farm
workers by 60,000 (about 5 perrent of its 1979 level). He also reports
that disaggregated regional estimates, although not statistically
significant, exhibit some adverse employment effects. Unfortunately,
the individual regional estimates are not reported making it impos-
sible to compare their relative sizes.
Earlier time-series analyses are based on feweryears experience with the
minimum wage in agriculture1 during a period when that minimumwas lower
relatiye to other wages. These studies find larger reductions inemploymentPage 52
due to the minimum than Gardner's five percent estimate. For example,
4ardner (1972), using annual data over the 1947-70 period, estimates
that the 1966 FLSA-extended minimum wage coverage reduced hired farm
employment by about 18 percent from what it would otherwise have been
in the 1967-70 period. Theodore Lianos (1972), studying twelve south-
ern states forming three regions over the 1950-69 period, finds that
both total and hired farm employment decreased with the imposition of
a Federal minimum wage on the agricultural sector. Over the years 1967
to 1969, the reduction in employment under various assumptions is
estimated to have been between 24 and 51 percent. F.H. Gallasch
(1975), using pooled cross-section data, also finds significant dis-
employment effects associated with the imposition of a minimum wage,
i.e., that over the 1951-71 period, a 10 percent increase in the
agricultural minimum wage resulted in a 6 percent decrease in the
employment of hired farm workers.
In a more specialized study, John Trapani and J.R. Moroney (1981)
estimate the effect of the 1966 FLSA amendments on employment of
seasonal cotton workers, as the difference between actual employment
and that predicted (based on 190-66 data) to have occurred in the
absence of the 1966 introduction of a minimum wage. Using pooled
cross-section data on 14 cotton-producing states, they find that
• extended minimum wage coverage accounts for 65 percent of the decline
• in peak-month cotton-farming jobs between 1967 and 1969. With em-
plovment on cotton farms plummeting from 193,000 to 47,000 betweenPage 53
these years, the authors' estimates indicate tht theminimum-wage-
nduced employment decrease would be about 40 percent. As might be
expected, the greatest effects are found in regions wherewages, on
average, are lower -—thesouth central and southeastern states.
Although the results of these studies are consistent in finding
significant disemployment effects, they must be interpreted withcare.
First, the effects of the agricultural minimum wage are made difficult
to interpret by the heterogeneity of the farm labor force, which in-
cludes low-skill manual laborers and high-skillmanagers, children and
retired persons, full-time workers and seasonal/part-time laborers.33
Additional problems arise with both the measurement and classification
of agricultural employment. Although nearly all studies use the number
of hired farm workers as the dependent variable, there is evidence
that a number of family farm workers (for whom data are also collected
in the agricultural survey) should be included as hired labor. This
exclusion could lead to an overestimate of the proportionate minimum
wage effects. The distinction between self—employed and hired labor is
also sometimes difficult to make. Sharecroppers, for example, are
counted as self-employed, but may work for wages at certain times, and
many farm owner-operators work for wages on other farms.
Second, the minimum wage effects are difficult to interpret be-
cause of the exempt status of many employers and employees, serious
doubts about the degree of FLSA enforcement, and the questionable
knowledge of the legal requirements among both farmers and farm work-Page 54
ers. For example, immediate family members of a farm operator are
exempt, but more distant relatives often do farm work on the 11family"
farm. Formally, they are subject to the provisions of the FLSA, if
they are paid a wage, but there is doubtless great temptation to
forego the formality in such cases. There is also reason to believe
that the formality is ignored in the case of nonrelative neighbors
with whom there are long-standing work relationships.
Third, although all studies include one or more trended
variables (e.g. ,ttimeIor nonfarm wages) which should yield more
confidence in the interpretation of the effects of the minimum wage
variable, the specification of the minimum wage variable itself is
open to question. Trapani and Moroney (1981) do not include an ex-
plicit minimum wage variable in their study, Lianos (1972) uses a
crude dummy-variable proxy, and Gardner (1972) employs the nominal
value of the minimum wage. Gallasch (1975) and Gardner (1981)
deflate the nominal minimum by economy-wide (not agricultural)
price indices, although the reason for this specification
is unclear. Although coverage data are not rich, none of the studies
attempts to account for changes in coverage, nor is there any mention
in the studies of its potential impact. This omissionmay have rela-
tively minor consequences, however, because coverage has not varied
greatly since agriculture was first covered in 1967.Page 55
Finally, apart from Gardner's 1981 paper, no study includes
more than five observations in the post-1966period. Pooling
cross-section data is one way to circumvent thisproblem
(Gallasch, 1975).
On balance, these problems do not lead one to conclude that the
estimates are biased in a known direction. Rather, they raiseques-
tions about the reliability of the estimates in that theproblems
could lead tOejther over- or under-estimates of the "true" minimum-
wage effect.
In a descriptive study of the extension ofcoverage to certain
hired farm workers, the U.S. Department of Labor also acknowledgesa
sharp drop in agricultural employmenton covered farms after the intro-
duction of the $1.00 minimum in1967(U.S. Department of Labor, 1972,
p. 23). However, the relative drop was smaller among covered than among
uncovered farms. The analysis is weakened by the failure to disen-
tangle the comparison of covered and uncovered farms from that of
large and small farms. Thus, if employment on larger farms would have
grown more rapidly or fallen less rapidly than on others in the ab-
sence of minimum wage coverage, the comparisons between covered and
uncovered farms will understate any negative employment impact of the
minimum wage.
Retail Trade. There are several published studies of the impact
of extending (partial) minimum wage coverage to the heterogeneous,
low-wage retail trade sector. According to a U.S. Department of LaborPage 56
analysis (U.S. Department of Labor, 1963, p. 40), employment in covered
establishments in the South (where the impact of a $1.00 mthimum lip-
posed i, September 1961 was greatest) fell by 10.6 percent between
June 1961 and June 1962, while employment in uncovered establishments
rose by 4.8 percent. Analogously, another Department of Labor study
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1966b, p. 49) reports that nationally uncov-
ered employment grew slightly faster than covered employment during
this period. However, the same study indicates that the covered sector
grew more rapidly in the succeeding three years, during which there
were two increases in the minimum applicable to retail trade.
In a later study of a large segment of the retail trade indus-
try--eating and drinking establishments--the degree of impact of the
1966 extension of minimum wage coverage is measured by the increase in
average wages necessary to bring all workers in an establishment up to
the minimum (U.S. Department of Labor, 1968a). Establisments are cate-
gorized as either °high-, low_,Pt or "no-impact.0 In this case, the
Department of Labor finds no clear correlation between the degree of
impact and the employment changes that followed the 1966 extension
of coverage.
Subsequent studies of the retail trade industry have reached
conflicting conclusions. William Shkurti and Belton Fleisher (1968)
conclude that while the adverse effect of the minimum wage on the
economy as a whole was probably small, some segments have experienced
subctntially less employment growth than would otherwise have oc-Page 57
curred. Analyzing employment changes from 1961 to 1965(a period which
Includes the effective dates for the $1.00 and $1.15 minimain retail
trade), they find that employment grew most slowly in those 'lines of
business (e.g.,varietystores) in which the wage impact of the
minimum was the largest. Moreover, within some lines ofbusiness, the
rate of increase of employment was smaller in the South(where the
impact of the minimum wage was the largest) than elsewhere.However,
Jack Karlin's (1967) analysis of the 1961-1966employment changes
(which included the September 1965 increase to $1.25) reachesvery
different conclusions. Specifically, he finds that covered retail
trade employment rose more rapidly in the South than elsewhere and
that the larger increases in employment occurred in those lines of
retail trade where the wages of a considerable fraction of the work-
force would have to have been raised to the level of $1.25per hour.
These divergent conclusions appear to reflect differences injudging
whether two columns of numbers (minimum wage impact and employment
growth) are or are not related, as well as differences in the time
periods studied and other differences in the data utilized. Neither of
these studies presentsformal measures of statistical association to
support the qualitative inferences; neither controls for pre-existing trends.
In partial response to the shortcomings and inconsistencies of
these studies of retail trade employment, we have applied conventional
regression techniques to the same data. Two alternative dependent
variables (percentage change in hours and persons employed) werePage 58
regressed on a minimum wage variable (the percent of workers in cov-
ered establishments in 1961 who were earning less than the 'new"
minimum wage) for three alternate time periods (1961-62, 1961-65, and
1961-66). In addition, alternate specifications of the equation con-
tain differing combinations of the following control variables:
region of the country, line of business, and percentage change in
employment in the uncovered sector (coefficient constrained to 1.0).
Because the number of observations is limited to 26 (seven lines of
business x four regions, minus two cells too small to report), none of
the coefficients can be estimated with much precision and none of the
minimum wage effects would be judged statistically significant by
conventional standards. However, in all versions of the equation
containing the full complement of control variables, the minimum wage
variable's coefficient carries a negative sign. Nonetheless, as noted
in assessing the studies of agriculture, the value of even careful
statistical anaysis is weakened to the extent that the covered-uncov-
ered comparison really reflects an underlying "large-small" compari-
son. If larger retail trade establishments would have grown more
rapidly than others in the absence of minimum wage coverage, then
comparisons between covered and uncovered firms will understate any
negative impact of the minimum wage, unless size of establishment is
held constant.
Based on annual data covering the period 1948-1979, Boschen and
Grossman (1981) use time-series regressions to estimate a significantPage 59
disernployment effect of the minimum wage in the retail trade sector.
Although their results do not present an estimate of disemployment due
directly to the 1961 imposition of the minimum, theirmethodology does
produce an estimated (short-run) elasticity of employment withrespect
to the minimum of -.03. For comparisonpurposes, this is about one-
fifth as large as their estimated elasticity ofemployment of all
teenagers.
Instead of focusing on the effects of the minimumwage on the
level of employment, Janice Madden and Joyce Cooper (1981) askwhether
the minimum wage affected states' share of output andemployment in
wholesale and retail trade. To the extent that firms' decisionson
where to locate are based on labor costs, increases in the minimum
wage should make states with larger concentrations of low-wage workers
or a larger fraction of workers subject to minimumwage laws less
attractive locations. Low-wage states may be growing because theirwages
are low, and this would increase their share of wholesale and retail trade
employment. Madden and Cooper deal with this to some extent by controlling
for the growth of state population and income. Theyreport no consistent
evidence of the hypothesized effects in either industry. Theynote, however,
that limitations of the state—by-industry data base they constructed back
to 1958 may have obscured such effects.
In a study of the age composition of retail trade employment, Philip
Cotterill and Walter Wadycki (1976) use 1967 Survey of Economic Op-
porturiity cross-section data to analyze the effect of minimum wage
coverage on the substitution between teenage and adult labor. Although
they conclude that there Is no evidence that employers substituted forPage 60
teenage labor, the study clearly suffers from the inability to measure
what would have been the utilization rate of the two groups in the ab-
sence of the minimum wage. In addition, their conclusion runs counter
to the findings in David Kauns (1965) study of substitution in low-
wage manufacturing industries. He is able to show that as a result of
a change in relative factor costs, due to a minimum wage increase,
firms alter relative factor inputs, with the greatest change
taking place where the minimum wage requires the greatest upward wage
adjustment (most notably among small producers).
In probably the most thorough statistical study of a specific
industry, Fleisher (1981) concludes that employment in retail trade
has been significantly curtailed as a result of the 1961 imposition
and the subsequent increases in the Federal minimum wage. Using an
admixture of time-series regressions, forecast relative wages in
retail trade, and estimates of consumer demand equations for retail
trade services, he infers that during the 1960s retail trade employ-
ment was about 5 percent lower than it would otherwise have been for
each 5 percent that the averaqr' hourly labor cost in retail trade was
raised by increases in the minimum wage. Further, he finds that em-
ployment measured by hours of wrrk was reduced in greater proportion
than was employment measured hy persons working. It should be noted
that this implied 'elasticity' with a value approximately equal to
one, is not comparable to the economy-wide minimum wage elasticities
of employment discussed in preceding sections of this paper. In fact,Page 61
Fleisher opts for a minimum wage variable different fromany of
those utilized in other time-series studies; namely, 'the proportionate
increase in the forcast wage needed to bring all workers at least to
the minimum wage'(p. 85).
Despite the general confirmation of significant disemployment in
retail trade resulting from the imposition of the legal wage floor,
Fleisher finds notable variation within the industry. Specifically,
his disaggregated results point to a negligible (nonsignificant) ef-
fect on department store employment and particularly strong effects on
variety stores and food stores, although in the latter case, the
impact on hours of work is much weaker than on number of persons work-
ing. This nonuniformity of findings and their consequently limited
generalizability is compounded by the omission from the multivariate
analyses of eating and drinkinq places, many of which are major em-
ployers of minimum wage workers.
Service Industries. Analogous to its study of eating and drinking
establishments in the retail trade sector, the U.S. Department of
Labor has issued reports on several service industries in which mini-
mum wage coverage was extended by the 1966 FLSA Amendments; namely
hospitals, hotels and motels, and laundries and cleaning establish-
ments. In each of thesethree cases the report finds no clear evidence
of a correlation between the degree of impact of extending minimum
wage coverage (i.e., the increase in average wages necessary to
bring all workers in an establishment up to the minimum) and the
employment changes following the extension (U.S. Department
of Labor, 1970, P. 27; U.S. Department of Labor, 1968b, p. 18;
U.S. Department of Labor, 1969, P. 18). The conclusion in thePage 62
laundry and cleaning services study, however, is incorrect.34 It is
noteworthy that these studies are focused only on determining whether
high-impact establishments had smaller employment increases (or larger
employment declines) than low-impact establishments. There are addi-
tional important, if subtle, questions that might be addressed with
these data: (1) Is it likely that any observed relationship between the
degree of impact and employment changes could be due to chance alone?
(2) How large is the relationship (if any) between degree of impact
and employment change?
Both questions can be answered by combining the data for various
industries from these studies and computing the average 'elasticity"
of employment to minimum wage impacts. The basic assumption underlying
this procedure is that, apart from the minimum wage increase, employ-
ment in high-, medium-, and low-impact establishments in a particular
industry would have grown or declined by approximately the same pro-
portion. We allowgrowth rates in different industries to differ.
Because we are computing an average elasticity, differences in degree
of responsiveness among establishments are ignored.
Our preferred estimates of the employment elasticity are in the
-.05 to —.12 range, implying that a minimum wage increase which had a
wageimpact of 10 percent would reduce employment by about 1
percent.35 However, these estimates are not very precise, owing to the
small number of observations (four industries times four impact
groups) and would not pass conventional tests of statistical signifi-Page 63
cance, i.e. ,estimatesof this size could arise due to chance alone
when the "true" elasticity was zero. On the other hand, it is well to
bear in mind that these estimates are probably biased downward by
virtue of the low-wage high-impact establishments being concentrated
in the South, where employment would have grown more rapidly in the
absence of extended minimum wage coverage.
In a descriptive study, Kenneth Gordon (1981) focuses on the
private household service sector's response to the 1974 minimum wage
coverage extension by comparing the rate of change in employment of
privatehousehold workers (defined to exclude employees of firms offering
cleaning or similar services) before and after 1974. He finds that since
1974the long-term decline in the absolute number of household workers
has slowed dramatically, precisely the opposite of what one would
expect to observe if the minimum wage were having an adverse effect on
employment in this sector. 36 Gordon does find that black women in this
industry experienced large employment losses over the 1974-78 period,
although he concludes that this is probably not related to the exten-
sion of minimum wage coverage since wages for blacks are considerably
higher than those for whites. Nevertheless, he points to other ways in
which a disemployment effect of the extension of coverage has been
manifested. There is some evidence that hours of work have been
slightly reduced and that the amount of involuntary part-time work has
increased. Gordon concludes that one principal reason for the modest
observed effects in this sector is the even more modest levels of
compliance with and enforcement of the law.Page 64
B. Employment Effects in Low-wageManufacturing
In connection with the 1956 increase in the minimum wage, the
U.S. Department of Labor studied several manufacturing industries in
which it could reasonably be expected that employment effects would be
discernible. The analyses are based on establishment-level employment
data from before and after the date of the increase in the minimum
wage, as is described above in the discussion of newly covered service
industries. Twelve low-wage industries have been studied, and in some
cases the industries are further subdivided according to geographic
region. In general, the studies focus on the Southern portion of
low-wage industries, because the greatest impacts were expected to
occur there. In each industry, establishments are categorized into
"high-," "medium-," and "low-impact" groups according to the increase
in average wages needed to bring all workers in the establishment up
to the minimum, relative to other establishments in that industry. In
general, the percentage change in employment is found to be more
positive (or less negative) in the low—impact than in the high-impact
establishments.3? On average, the increase in employment in high-
impact firms is 5 percent lower than that in low-impact firms (U.S.
Department of Labor, ].959a, p. 9).
Once again, the failure to fully exploit the available data
prompts us to reanalyze them in search of somewhat more precise
answers to the question of the employment impact of the change in the
minimum wage. Unlike the case of the service industries, analysis ofPage 65
the low-wage manufacturing sector is complicated by the fact that
employment was measured in different months in different industries.
On the other hand, more observations in themanufacturing data in-
creases the precision of our estimates in comparison to the service
industries. Our preferred estimate38 is -0.24, suggesting thata
minimum wage increase with a direct 'impact' of 10percent would
reduce employment by 2.4 percent. The alternate specifications of the
equation suggest employment losses which are larger than the preferred
estimates, but not dramatically so (the median estimate is -0.36). The
preferred estimate is statistically significant, i.e., it is quite
unlikely that the result would arise from chance alone.
In the broader context of estimating labor demand equations,
Zucker (1973) uses quarterly Ume-series data to analyze the impact of
minimum wage changes on employn'ent. in seven low-wage, nondurable-goods
manufacturing industries during the period 1947-1966. By and large, the
empirical results are in conformity with the theoretical expectations
that increases in the minimum wqe (relative to the actualaverage
wage) lead to reductions in employment. This disemployment impact is
found to prevail for both number of workers and number of hours
worked, and the results imply that the latter were adjusted both more
rapidly and to a larger extent than was the former.39
Mixon (1975) also uses time-series data to investigate the impact
of minimum wage changes on employment in twenty (three-digit)low-wage
manufacturing industries during the period 1958-1969.° Using thePage 66
length of the average (regular) workweek as themeasure of employment,
the minimum wage is found to have theexpected effect in but 6 of the
20 industries. Moreover, in only 2 of the 20 is thereevidence that
increasing the minimum resulted in a significant decrease in the
average amount of overtime worked per week.
Similarly mixed but somewhat stronger results are reported in
Boschen and Grossman's (1981) study of eightlow-wage manufacturing
industries based on annual data for the period 1948-1979.The com-
posite minimum wage effect on employment is found to benegative in
six of the eight industries and, in half of thesecases, the coeffi-
cient is statistically significant. Onaverage, the results imply that
a 10 percent increase in the mnimum wage would diminishemployment by
just less than 1 percent.
C. Evidence from Low-Wage Areas
In pursuit of the impact of the increase in the minimumwage to
$1.00, effective March 1956, the U.S. Department of Labor also col-
lected data on employment before and after the increase inseven
low-wage areas. Comparisons of the change in covered employment with
the "degree of impact" of the increased minimum show(1) larger em-
ployment gainin high-impact areas when comparing February 1956 with
April 1956 and (2) no relationship when comparing April 1956 with
• April 1957 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1959b,pp. 250 and 254).' A
later analysis compares the growth of covered employment relativetoPage 67
uncovered employment. Covered employment 5foundto have grown faster,
-althoughthe reverse is found when the analysis is restricted to those
establishments included in both the pre- and post-increase surveys
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1959a, p. 11).
Similar data have been collected to study the effects of the 1961
and 1963 increases in Southern metropolitan, Southern nonmetropolitan,
and North Central noninetropolitan areas. An early analysis (U.S. De-
partment of Labor, 1965, p. 14) of the Southern nonmetropolitan areas
uses the high- versus low—impact comparison and finds no employment
effects.
A later report which analyzes data for all three types of areas
places much less reliance on the degree-of-impact comparisons (U.S. De-
partment of Labor, 1966a, pp. 64, 97, 130-131). While some problems
are noted in newly covered retail trade establishments (U.S. Department
of Labor, 1966a, pp. 66-67, 98, 131), the general conclusion is that
there were no harmful employment effects. But this conclusion rests
largely on the (virtually irrelevant) fact that covered employment
generally rose after the minimum wage increases.
Marshall Colberg (1960) anlyzes the growth of manufacturing
employment in Florida from January 1956 to April 1956 by studying a
matched sample of plants, but the data are aggregated so that the
county is the unit of observation. He finds a negative relationship
• that is marginally statistically significant between the rate of
increase in hourly wages and employment growth.42 Generally, therePage 68
are, however, some hints that high-wage counties would have grown more
rapidly even in the absence of the minimum wage (p. 114).
In a time-series study over the 1970-1977 period, Charlie Carter
(1978) finds that increases in the minimum wage have adverse effects
on unemployment rates, with the degree of impact greater in low-wage
regions like the Southeast. Specifically, his equation implies that a
10 percent increase in the minimum wage (Kaitz) variable would raise
the jobless rate in the eight Southeastern states together by half a
percentage point.
The most methodologically sophisticated study of the effect of
the minimum wage in low-wage industries and areas is that of Heckman
and Sedlacek (1981). They apply their model (discussed in Section I)
to manufacturing employment in South Carolina from 1948-71. They esti-
mate the employment effects of the minimum wage separately for the
four race-sex groups, but do not. report estimates for black fe-
males.43 They find that the "direct" effect of a 20 percent increase
in the minimum wage would be to reduce employment by 22, 36 and 34
percent for white males, white females, and black males, respectively.
The "indirect" effects of risinq skill prices on employment are posi-
tive, but small (no more than 3 percentage points for any group).
As noted in Section I, the assumption of the model that all those who
remain employed in the covered sector experience the same proportional
wage Increase is questionable. Moreover, the wage distribution pre-
dicted by the model does not have the spike at the minimum wage wePage 69
observe in real world data. These issuesare worrisome because Heckman
and Sedlacek (unlike nearly all otherpapers on this subject) use these
teoretjcal models in deriving rather thanin interpreting the re-
sults. The highly nonlinear modelmakes it impossible, for us at
least, to trace through theconsequences of these specification
choices for the estimates.Page 70
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our survey has focused on the effects of the minimum wage on
employment and unemployment. These effects are relevant to, but
do not uniquely determine, its efficiency and distributional
consequences. Thus, one cannot easily infer the deadweight loss
due to the minimum wage from its effects on labor force status."
Moreover, the effect of the minimum wage on the distribution of
income depends on its impact on the wage distribution and the
position of low—wage workers in the income distribution, as well as
the employment effects we have surveyed. The impact on wages includes
both the relatively straightforward raising of the wages of some
workers up to the minimum and the effect on wages above the minimum
(which is presumably positive for those just above the minimum, who
are good substitutes for minimum-wage workers). The impact on wages
would itself be the subject of a separate (though shorter) survey.
The relatively weak correlation between low wages and membership in low-
income households (Granilich, 1976; Kelly, 1976) weakens the impact
of the minimum wage on the distribution of household income, whatever
its effect on the distribution of earnings.5
Theoretical analysis of the relationship between the minimumwage
and employment and unemployment has been extended considerably in the
last decade. A major development has been the formal treatment ofa
minimum wage with partial coverage, and of workers' decisions to search
for covered employment rather than work in the uncovered sector. Ex-
tending that theory to deal with continuously variable labor quality
is a rather recent addition to the literature and hasmany applica-Page 71
tions beyond the minimum wage. Thus far, at least, theoretical models
which take account of continuously variable labor quality are relatively
complex, and that complexity is a decided drawback in empirical work
based on these models. An unanswered question is whether thiscomplexity
can be reduced without losing much of the realism of the models.
The most frequently studied group in the empirical literature is
teenagers. Time-series studies typically find that a 10 percent in-
icreasein the minimum wage reduces teenage employment by I to 3per-
cent. This range includes estimates based on a widerange of specifi-
cations and on different sample periods, but all used thesame basic
data source, the CPS. We believe that the lower halfof that range is
to be preferred; to the extent that differences inresults can be
attributed to differences in the specificationchosen, the better
choices seem to produce estimates at the lowerend of the range. There
may well be problems comon to all the studies which lead to under-
stating this impact, but that possibility remains to beshown. Cross—
section studies of the effect on teenageemployment produce a wider
range of estimated impacts, which are roughly centered on therange
found in the time-series research. Estimates ofthe minimum wage
effect of a 10 percent increase onteenage unemployment rates range
from zero to over three percent, but estimates from0 to .75 percentage
points are most plausible.
The effect of the minimum wage onyoung adult (20-24 years) em-
ployment is negative and smaller than that forteenagers. This con-
clusion rests on much less evidence than is available forthose 16-19
years. The direction of the effect on adult employment is uncertainin
the empirical work, as It is in the theory. Whilesome adults are un-Page 72
doubtedly displaced by the minimum wage, others may be employed because
the minimum wage protects them from teenage competition. Uncertainty
about the effects on adults is a serious gap in the literature, since
half of all minimum wage workers (and, of course, a larger fraction of
all workers) are adults.
Less can be said with confidence about the effect of the minimum
wage on employment in low-wage industries and areas. In part, this
reflects a smaller number of studies and the fact that there is less re-
cent work (and therefore less work with now-common statistical tools)
to survey. Negative employment effects are a consistent feature of the
studies of low-wage manufacturing and agriculture, but findings are
quite mixed elsewhere. In several studies, minimum wage effects are
reported as the ratio of the percentage change in covered employment
to the percentage increase in average wages due to the minimumwage.
This elasticity of covered-sector labor demand is about -1.0 in some
cases, and less than one in absolute value in others.
With few exceptions, the theoreticaldevelopments of the last
decade have had relatively little effecton the estimation of minimum
wage effects. It is difficult to distinguish a 1970paper from a 1980
paper from the empirical work alone. While the theory is usefulin
interpreting the results, its integration into theempirical work is,














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cross-Section Studies of the Federal Minimum Wage
by Major Characteristics
Notes: E/P =employment/populationratio
E1 dummy variable for individual employment status
'Four employment by enrollment statuses distinguished.
2Ful 1-time/part-time and covered/uncovered employment distinguished.
3lncluded in construction of minimum wage variable; not included as a separate variable.
4School expenditures per pupil; farm/total population; 1'female—headed"/total families with
children; nonwhite/total population; adult female education.
Proportion of teenagers enrolled in federal training programs; individual's urban resi-
dence (yes/no), schooling, armed forces, family size, etc.
6Unionization; median adult schooling; school expenditures per pupil; p, an estimate of
the dependent variable based on its 1960 value, adjusted for (non-minimum wage) trends.
All independent variables except p' expressed as proportional 1960 to 1970 changes.
'Also labor force participation and unemployment rates.
1Demand for agricultural workers; retail sales (as proxy for nonfarm labor demand; propor-
tion of nonwhite teenagers in school; duimiy variable for Southern states; E/P from pre-
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Welch and Cunningham (1978) 4828






















acomputed from disaggregated estimates; no significance tests available
bNot reported. From reported coefficients,an estimate of 5 to 8 percent (posi-
tive) can be inferred.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Converse et a]. (1981, p. 282) based on interviews with employers,
report that only 12 percent of the disemployment due to the 1980 in-
crease in the minimum wage took the form of discharges.
2One "test" of the monopsony model is to determine whether itis com-
mon for a small number of employers to employ a majority of the work-
ers in a labor market. Robert Bunting's (1962,p. 101) study of 1,774
labor markets (most "labor markets" being counties) found that the
four largest employers employed at least half of the semi- andun-
skilled workers in less than 3.7 percent of the labor markets.
3lncreased effort is just one potential offset toa minimum wage.
Other working conditions or fringe benefits,especially opportunities
for on-the-job training, have been considered by Martin Feldstein(1973),
Wilson Mixon (1975), David Luskin (1979), Walter Wessels (1980),
Masanori Hashimoto (1981), Jacob Mincer and Linda Leighton (1981), and
Edward Lazear and Frederick Miller (1981).
41t is even possible that employers would gain from a minimumwage,
though Pettengill does not emphasize that possibility. In effect, the
minimum wage would lead employers to confront workers with a level-of-
effort requirement that a competitive market would not otherwise
permit.
5the statement in the text ignores worker risk aversion. Allan King
(1974) and Gramlich (1976) relax this assumption, though in a one-
sector model context.Page 82
6 In the conventional theory of labor demand in competitive markets,
the (constant-output) elasticities of demand are
= n(E)/ 2fl(W) =
k101j
where k is group j's share of total costs ando.
is the elasticity
of substitution of inputs i and j. The elasticity of total employment
with respect to is
=
h1+ (l-h)2
Let j=3 index a composite nonlabor input. The substitutability
assumptions in the text are that012 and 013 are positive. Since 012







Substituting k11 for each in the expression for and then sub-




7Converse, et al. (1981, p. 299) report, based on employer interviews
that "Of establishments giving a wage increase to maintain differen-
tials (after the 1980 increase in the minimum wage to $3.10), approxi-
mately 47 percent indicated that the differential increases stopped
at a wage of $4.00 per hour or less.'
8Gilroy (1981, p. 162) reports that roughly half of all those receiv-
ing the minimum wage or less received a wage equal to the minimum
wage. "Equal to" the ninimum wage was defined as within a 10 cent
interval centered on the minimum, but the overwhelming majority of
these workers reported receiving exactly the minimum.
9Robert Meyer and David Wise (1981) suggest another explanation --
workweeksare adjusted until the ratio of marginal product to hours
worked is equal to the minimum wage.
'°For the economy as a whole, minimum wage workers (those earning the
minimum wage or less) account for only about 4 percent of labor costs,
and therefore an even smaller fraction of total costs (Brown,
1 981 ).
11Theincrease which took effect in March 1956 was approved in August
1955; those which took effect in September 1961 and September 1963
were approved in May 1961; those which became effective in Febru-
ary 1967 and 1968 were approved late in September 1966; the May 1974
and January 1975 increases were approved in April 1974; and the mostPage 84
recent increases, which became effective in January 1978-81were en-
acted in November 1977. Thus, the first increase mandatedby each
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act was approvedan average of
3 months in advance of its effective date, whileremaining increases
were announced more than a year before they became effective.
12Welch (1976) contains modifications to Welch (1974) as suggestedby
Frederic Siskind (1977). See also Welch (1977).
13Gramlich (1976) finds that among teenagers (and to some extent among
adult men) there is a rise in part-time employment and a decline in
full-time employment due to increases in the minimum wage. Mattila's
(1981, p. 77) results are consistent with those of Gramlich for 18-19
year olds but not for 14-17 year olds. In studies of low-wage manu-
facturing industries (not limited to young workers), Albert Zucker
(1973) finds relatively small reductions in weekly hours worked by
production workers due to the minimum wage, while Mixon (1975) finds
some evidence that the minimum increased regular hours of work (over-
time effects were weak and inconsistent among industries).
14Comparisons of .pjyment estimates from the CPS and a special test
sample utilizing the more restrictive but objective procedures were
well within the expected sampling error; unemplqyment estimates under
the new definition, however, were about 100,000 lower in 1966 than the
official CPS figure. Unemployment among teenagers averaged 65,000 or 1
full percentage point less than the CPS estimate.Page 85
15Brozen report5 changes in unemployment rates in monthsspanning
minimum wage changes. This is formally equivalent toa dummy-variable
approach.
'6Kelly (1976) uses two other specifications: one which weights. the
variable by the industrial distribution of adults, and another which
assumes that the equilibrium (market-clearing) wage of teenagers has
risen one-half as fast as average hourly earnings inmanufacturing.
17Wachter and Kim also use teen earnings in their relativewage term
but, unlike Harnermesh,exclude coverage and do not include the teenage!
adult wage ratio. This leads to the debatable restriction that doub-
ling both average teenage wages and the minimum wage leaves teenage
employment unaffected.
18Note that virtually all of the studies discussed aboveestimate em-
ployment equations whose dependent variable is the employment-to-
ppulation rato. Thus, even studies which appear not to introduce
supply side variables in the list of independent variables have ef-
fectively included such factors in the dependent variable. Ifemploy-
ment of teenagers is really demand determined, theproper dependent
variable would be employment, not the employment-to-population ratio.
19The above argument might suggest an interaction of the minimum wage
with relative teenage population in determining teenage unemployment.
Given the difficulty in estimating even first-order effects precisely,
the interactive approach has not been pursued. Note, however, thatPage 86
equations which use the logarithm of the unemployment rate as the
dependent variable implicitly impose a multiplicative interaction
between relative supply and the minimum wage.
20The only case where the estimates are dramatically affected by such
a choice is Abowd and Killingsworth (1981). They present one equation
based on a constrained nonlinear estimation, and another approximate,
but still constrained, estimate. We include the former in the
table; the approximation produces a larger estimated effect, -4.28
(1.99). The constraints depend on the identification of teenagers with
minimum wage workers and adults with above-minimum wage workers. Since
about half of all teenagers earn the minimum wage, and less than half
of all minimum wage workers are teenagers, we find the constraints
quite debatable.
21Wachter and Kim are quite cautious about the interpretation of their
"minimum wage" coefficients in light of the failure of coverage to
contribute to the equation. They argue that their coefficients can be
seen as reflecting changes in government social welfare expenditures
during the 1960s, as well as the minimum wage.
22Kelly (1975 and 1976) also includes a welfare variable in equations
explaining female labor force status. However, his "residualization"
of this variable effectively guarantees that the estimated minimum
wage impact will not be appreciably affected by the welfare variable's
inclusion.Page 87
23We find that the two specification choices with the largest impact
are including a measure of welfare benefits or the young adult (20-24)
population share. Both tend to increase the estimated impact of the
minimum wage by about one half of apercentagepoint, compared with the Table
3 value. However, in each case the added variable has a significant
but wrong-signed (positive) effect on teenage employment.
24Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1981) find no significant effect of the
decision on whether to include the teenage population share in an
equation which runs the entire 1954-79 sample period and which also
includes most of the previously mentioned control variables.
25The only papers which compare lagged and unlagged forms of the same
equation show relatively small differences. Hamermesh (1981) reports
slightly larger disemployment effects with lagged responses, but
prefers the unlagged estimates because the a flriori case for lags is
weak. Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1981) add an Almon lag to an equation
which includes the current-quarter value but cannot reject the hypo-
thesis that there is no lagged response. For a discussion of the diffi-
culty in estimating distributed lag models in this context, see
Wachter (1976).
26Differences in average wage level prove far more important than dif-
ferences in Federal coverage (Welch and Cunningham, 1978, p. 144).Page 88
27Unfortunately, adding additional control variables need not bring
the minimum wage effect closer to its "true' value. For example, mea-
surement error in the minimum wage variable 'ould tend to reduce the
absolute value of its coefficient; adding variables correlated with
it (i.e. ,correlatedwith average wage levels) would further depress
the estimated minimum wage effect.
281n the early section of his paper, Freeman also includes a broader
set of control variables, but the minimum wage coefficients for these
equations are not reported.
29Cogan's results may be distorted by the form chosen for several of
the control variables. For example, in explaining the change in the
proportion of nonwhite male teenagers in each state who are employed,
his variable controlling for changing agricultural demand is the num-
erical change in such labor demand (e.g., -20,000 workers) rather than
the change in (agricultural demand/population).
30Linneman reports that, when wage gains and employment reductions
are both taken into account, earnings of adultswho would otherwise
earn less than the minimum wage are reduced by the minimum wage in-
crease. This finding would imply at least a 1 percent reduction in employ-
mcnt of theseadults in response to a 1 percent increase in the
minimum.Page 89
31.Jfworkerswith predicted wages slightly above the minimum are the
only above-minimum workers to experience employment reductions, the
result could be easily rationalized. -If W is the offered wage for a
worker at the lower minimum wage, W is the predicted wage, BndWm the
minimum wage,then WW ,the condition that the worker would be displaced
by the minimum, would still occur with nonzero probability even if W*
exceeded W.In fact, Linneman's actual disemployment estimates run too
far up the predicted wage distribution for this to be a likely explan-
ation.
32An example of earlier agriculturalresearch that isconsistentwith
4iis position is Frank Maier (1961).
33See Gardner (1981) for an extended discussion of this.
341n the other two studies, as well as in the study of eating and
drinking places, the conclusion is based on the average percent change
in employment in 'thigh-," "medium-, "low-," and "nu-impact"establish
ments. In the study of laundry and cleaning services, however, the
conclusion rests on a cross-tabulation of the degree of impact and
the direction of change in employment (no change, increase, decrease).
Using Appendix Table 35 of the report, we calculated the average em-
ployment change by impact group. the measure used in the other studies.Page 90







35The choice of weights makes a considerable difference to the
estimates. If the less plausible establisirnient weights are used,
the employment effects would be considerably larger and "significant"
statistically. As noted in footnote 34, there is a consistent negative
relationship between impact and employment growth in laundry and dry
cleaning (an industry with many small establishments) but not in other
industries, so that the establishment weighting gives greater weight to
the industry with the strongest negative relationship.
36This is in accord with the findingsby Yale Brozen (1962), but for a
very different reason, under different circumstances. When the minimum
wage rose, Brozen finds that the number of persons employedas house-
hold workers actually rose. Apparently,some of the persons who lost
jobs in the covered sectors as well as those who wouldnormally have
entered and failed to find work, took jobs in thethen-noncovered
household sector.Page 91
37Depending on how "industry" is defined, and the time after the in-
crease when the increase was measured, this pattern was observed in
eight industries out of twelve (U.S. Department of Labor 1959a, p. 9),
ten out of eleven (George Macesich and Charles Stewart, 1960, p. 286),
nine out of fourteen (John Peterson and Charles Stewart, 1969, p. 78),
or thirteen out of fourteen (Peterson and Stewart, 1969, p. 79). See
also H.M. Douty (1960).
38The "preferred" estimate uses all of the available data and weights
the observations by initial employment. The number of industry dummy
variables included and the inclusion or exclusion of averageestablish-
ment size make almost no difference, given the choice of dependent
variable and weighting.
39Zucker's estimates of the elasticity of employment with respectto
the minimum wage (relative to the one-period lag average wage)is -0.91
for hours of work and —0.79 for number of workers (p, 275).
40This study actually attempts to focus attention on other economic
effects of the minimum wage using such dependent variables asthe
average amount of overtime work per week,the layoff rate and the
quit rate. All in all, the empirical results forthose measures are
no more regular than those for the length of the regularworkweek.
Nixon enters the real minimum and average wages as separate variables,
so his estimate of the effect of the minimum wage would not be affected
by changes in employment due to the average wage level per Se.Page 92
41The latter comparison is somewhatstrange, since the base period' of
...the comparison Is one month after the minimum became effective. Pre-
sumably, the intention is to determine whether there areany "extra"
effects that occur after the first month at thenew minimum.
42Each 1 percent increase in average wages is associated with a .12
percent reduction in employment when all counties are included. Among
low-wage counties, the estimated relationship is much larger (.92 percent
versus .12 percent) but the estimate is less significant statistically
(.15 versus .10 level) (Colberg. 1960, p. 113).
3They found it impossible to obtain reasonable estimates of the
parameters of the skill distribution for black females. They attribute
this to the enormous increase in black female employment in
manufacturing (a 791 percent increase from 1960 to 1971),
presumably due to factors not captured by the model
Since their model is overidentified, the exclusion of a demographic
group has no effect on the identification of the remaining parameters
of their model.
Effects on labor force status depend on but often do not identify
the underlying supply and demand elasticities. Moreover, the offsets"
mentioned in footnote 3 would greatly complicate the measurement of
deadweight loss.
5For recent studies on the effects on the wage and income
distributions, see Report of the Minimum Wage Study Commission
(1981), vol. VI and VII.Page 93
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